Nothing Is Obligatory Upon Allah

Introduction

Among the most consequential theological questions in Islamic thought is whether anything becomes obligatory upon Allāh, Exalted is He, by virtue of His relationship to creation. Does He owe His servants anything? Is He bound to act in their best interest? Must He always bring about what is most beneficial for them in their religion or worldly life?

The answer is clear. Nothing is obligatory upon Allāh toward His creation, not even doing what is most fitting and most beneficial for them. No claim arises against Him. No right binds Him. No standard stands above Him.

This principle safeguards the absolute sovereignty of Allāh and preserves the distinction between Creator and creation. It rejects the notion that divine action is constrained by human assessments of benefit, fairness, or optimal outcomes. At its core, this doctrine affirms that Allāh judges, and He is not judged.

The implications of this principle are not merely abstract. They touch the existence of Hell, the creation of Iblīs, the reality of misguidance, and the eternal destiny of souls. They also expose a fatal flaw in the doctrine of al-aṣlaḥ, the claim that Allāh is obligated to do what is most beneficial for each servant.

What follows is a structured exposition of this position.

I. Nothing Is Obligatory Upon Allāh

Obligation among created beings arises under specific conditions. A debtor must repay a loan because he has taken what does not belong to him. A judge must rule with justice because he has accepted an office of trust. A person must fulfill a promise because he has bound himself by speech. In all such cases, obligation arises from lack, dependency, or accountability.

None of these apply to Allāh.

He owns the heavens and the earth. He is not subject to deficiency. He is not accountable to another. There exists no authority above Him to impose a duty upon Him. The Qurʾān establishes this principle unambiguously:

﴿لَا يُسْأَلُ عَمَّا يَفْعَلُ وَهُمْ يُسْأَلُونَ﴾

“He is not questioned about what He does, but they will be questioned.” (21:23)

This verse draws the boundary clearly. Allāh acts in sovereignty. His servants are the ones subject to reckoning.

To claim that something becomes obligatory upon Him due to His servants is to invert the order of reality. It is to imagine that a right accrues against Him from the side of creation. He binds His servants. No servant binds Him.

II. The Doctrine of al-Aṣlaḥ

The doctrine of al-aṣlaḥ asserts that Allāh must always do what is most beneficial for His creation, particularly in matters of religion. According to this view, if a wiser or more beneficial outcome is available, divine wisdom would require bringing it about. Otherwise, it would constitute stinginess or foolishness.

This reasoning attempts to place divine action under rational evaluation. It begins with a premise drawn from human judgment. If a master can do what is best for his subject and does not do so, he is blameworthy. It then applies that premise to Allāh.

The response is not to deny that Allāh is wise or free from stinginess. Rather, it denies the leap from affirming wisdom to imposing obligation. To say that Allāh is wise is not to say that human reason can define, measure, or police what wisdom requires of Him.

Human perception of benefit is partial and confined to limited horizons. The Qurʾān teaches:

﴿وَعَسَىٰ أَن تَكْرَهُوا شَيْئًا وَهُوَ خَيْرٌ لَّكُمْۖ وَعَسَىٰ أَن تُحِبُّوا شَيْئًا وَهُوَ شَرٌّ لَّكُمْۗ وَاللَّهُ يَعْلَمُ وَأَنتُمْ لَا تَعْلَمُونَ﴾

“It may be that you dislike a thing while it is good for you, and it may be that you love a thing while it is bad for you. Allāh knows and you do not know.” (2:216)

If human beings cannot reliably determine what is best for themselves, how can they elevate their conception of what is most beneficial into a binding standard upon the Lord of the worlds?

The doctrine of al-aṣlaḥ presumes that human reason can evaluate all possible outcomes and determine which one maximizes benefit for every soul. Revelation does not support this assumption. Nor does observable reality.

III. Creation Is Not Restricted to Human Benefit

It is not permissible to say that Allāh created creation solely for their benefit. Revelation speaks differently:

﴿وَمَا خَلَقْتُ الْجِنَّ وَالْإِنسَ إِلَّا لِيَعْبُدُونِ﴾

“I did not create jinn and humans except that they worship Me.” (51:56)

Creation exists for His purpose, not as a contract guaranteeing optimal outcomes for creatures. The manifestation of His names such as al-Ḥakīm, al-ʿAzīz, al-Ghafūr, and al-Muntaqim is not reducible to the calculus of human comfort.

The benefit that returns to servants is real, but it is derivative. It flows from His wisdom and mercy. It is not the master principle to which He must submit.

To reduce divine purpose to creaturely benefit is to overlook realities explicitly affirmed in revelation.

IV. The Reality of Hell and Eternal Punishment

Consider the existence of the people of the Fire and their remaining therein forever. The Qurʾān states:

﴿وَالَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا لَهُمْ نَارُ جَهَنَّمَ لَا يُقْضَىٰ عَلَيْهِمْ فَيَمُوتُوا وَلَا يُخَفَّفُ عَنْهُم مِّنْ عَذَابِهَا﴾

“As for those who disbelieve, for them is the Fire of Hell. It is not decreed that they should die, nor is its punishment lightened for them.” (35:36)

If Allāh is obligated to bring about what is most beneficial for each servant, how is eternal punishment understood? By what measure is it the most beneficial outcome for the disbeliever?

If one replies that annihilation would have been better, then the principle of al-aṣlaḥ collapses. Why were they created at all? If eternal punishment contradicts the maximization of benefit, the doctrine must either deny the reality of eternal Hell or concede that divine action is not bound by that rule.

Revelation affirms eternal punishment. Therefore the rule that Allāh must always maximize creaturely benefit cannot stand.

V. The Empowerment of Iblīs

The empowerment of Iblīs presents the same difficulty. Allāh created him, granted him respite until the Day of Resurrection, and allowed his whispers to circulate among the children of Ādam.

If the non-creation of Iblīs would have been more beneficial for humanity, then the doctrine of al-aṣlaḥ would require that he not exist. Yet he exists. His misguidance is real. His influence is permitted.

Reality itself contradicts the idea that divine action is constrained by a single axis of maximizing creaturely benefit.

The world as it stands, with trials, disbelief, temptation, and punishment, cannot be reconciled with a theology that binds Allāh to the most favorable outcome for each individual soul in worldly terms.

VI. Wisdom Without Obligation

The rejection of al-aṣlaḥ does not entail denying divine wisdom. Two truths are affirmed simultaneously:

1. Nothing is obligatory upon Allāh.

2. Nothing He does is devoid of wisdom.

He is al-Ḥakīm. His actions are neither random nor vain. Yet His wisdom is not subject to human auditing. It is affirmed because He affirms it of Himself, not because reason imposes it upon Him.

When we witness guidance and misguidance, life and death, reward and punishment, we affirm two corresponding realities. From our side, we possess no claim upon Him and no authority to measure His acts. From His side, every act unfolds within perfect wisdom, even when its reality is hidden from us.

Conclusion

Divine sovereignty is not measured by creaturely standards. It is affirmed as revelation presents it. Allāh creates, commands, guides, and judges according to His will and wisdom. He is the Judge in every judgment, and none stands over Him.

Sources:

Qalāʾid al-ʿIqyān

al-ʿAyn wa-al-Athar

Lawāmiʿ al-Anwār al-Bahiyyah

al-Muʿtamad fī Uṣūl al-Dīn

al-Īḍāḥ fī Uṣūl al-Dīn